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Styles of Foreign Assistance: Policy Transfer and Domestic Development in SubSaharan African States
Kelechi Kalu
Ohio State University

Abstract: With the end of the Second World War in 1945, Official Development Assistance (ODA)
mainly from the United States went to formerly industrialized European countries to help rebuild
their war-torn infrastructures and societies. By the 1950s, Asian countries and societies such as
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan became major recipients of US and other international aid as
support for institutional and economic development. At that time, development in many African
states was the responsibilities of the colonial powers that had political and economic management
responsibilities in the colonial territories. With decolonization starting in 1957 and accelerating in
the 1960s in sub-Saharan Africa, and at the height of the Cold War, foreign assistance to the region
was mainly as support to governments on the basis of their ideological proclivities rather than for
institution building and economic development. With the end of the Cold War, the use of foreign
assistance as a tool of foreign policy has not changed, but countries like Japan, China and South
Korea have joined the club of donor nations in the international system. The question becomes: to
what extent are these new donors likely to change the game of foreign assistance to achieve better
economic development results than Western aid donors in Africa? This paper examines the
hypothesis that to the extent that Western and Asian donors continue the practice of policy transfers
that use funding decisions and implementations based on Western and Asian experiences devoid of
policy lessons from domestic realities, foreign assistance will remain ineffective as a significant tool
for economic development and growth in Africa. The bulk of the paper will focus on a comparative
analysis of foreign assistance and policy outcomes in Nigeria and Zambia.

Introduction
After the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States, through what came to be called
the Marshall Plan, provided significant amounts of financial and in-kind aid for the rehabilitation of
war-torn economies in Western Europe. By the mid-1950s, as Western Europe and the United States
faced the threat of the spread of socialism from the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern
Europe, the United States turned its attention to aiding the reconstruction effort in post-war Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan. These countries were considered frontline states for the fight against the
spread of communism and the United States believed that strengthening their economies and helping
them develop robust civil societies would make communist infiltration of these societies very
difficult. Hence, U.S. policymakers considered development aid to this part of the world an
important and effective way to fight what was considered the menace of socialism.
66
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Meanwhile, in the African colonies, economic and political development remained entirely in
the hands of the European powers that had control of these territories. Nevertheless, the European
colonizers were not able to effectively control the pace of decolonization as many African freedom
fighters, some of whom had either participated in or were aware of the struggle for freedom in
Europe during World War II, were launching bloody battles against continued European domination
in the continent. Thus, by the mid-1950s, the decolonization project in the African colonies was
going quite strong, albeit with significant and bloody opposition from the Europeans in some
colonies such as French Algeria, Belgian Congo, French Cameroons, and the Portuguese colonies of
Angola and Mozambique.
By the early 1960s, several African colonies had gained independence and the new countries
were now facing a world split politically and economically into East (led by the Soviet Union) and
West (led by the United States). This was the height of what came to be known as the ―Cold War‖
and foreign aid to the new African countries, from both the East and West, was designed primarily to
entice these countries to support either of the globally feuding parties (i.e., socialist East and
capitalist West) in the international arena. Thus, foreign assistance to the African countries was
mainly a tool in support of governments on the basis of the ideological proclivities of their leaders
rather than for targeted institutional and economic development in the newly independent states. This
approach to the allocation of development assistance forced many African leaders to engage in
opportunistic, and to a certain extent, hypocritical behavior, in order to secure development
assistance, including food aid from the West or East. The outcome was that development assistance
was not granted based on domestic needs, as well as the efficiency with which the aid could improve
the welfare of African societies, but on the willingness of national leaders to support either Soviet or
American ideals at various global forums. For example, African countries that did not support U.S.
objectives at the United Nations, and hence voted against them, were not likely to be granted U.S.
aid even if such assistance was likely to have significant positive impact on the welfare of the poor
country‘s citizens. For example, during the time the United States actively supported the apartheid
government in South Africa, supposedly because of the regime‘s anti-communist posture, the
frontline states, notably Zambia, suffered significantly, not only from South African attacks but also
from U.S. neglect and denial of development assistance.
It is estimated that since 1945, the United States has provided the African countries with as
much as $1,000 billion in development assistance. Unfortunately, there is little by way of actual
development or actual positive economic and political transformation to show for this significant
amount of money (see The Banker 2004) Why? This is because most of the Cold War period was
largely characterized by foreign aid to authoritarian leaders in Africa without transparency in
governance and financial accountability. In fact, a significant portion of this development assistance
was granted to corrupt, opportunistic and authoritarian leaders in such countries as Egypt, Zaire (now
Democratic Republic of Congo), Liberia, and Kenya, all countries that were critical in the U.S. effort
to fight Soviet expansionism. While it is true that all these countries were and are still poor, and
hence, needed the resources for economic development, the award of these funds was not based on
the presentation, by these leaders of effective plans for domestic economic transformation. Most of
these leaders, after all, were dictators who used the additional resources obtained through foreign aid
67
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to prop-up their regimes and not for economic development. Hence, most foreign aid was used to
purchase regime security by, for example, co-opting competing elites and paying off others,
especially those (e.g., military elites) who were capable of overthrowing the government.
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about
an era of accountability and transparency in Africa—first, was the demise of the apartheid regime in
South Africa, and second, was the collapse of several authoritarian governments in the continent, and
third, was the ushering in of many democratic governments throughout the continent. Suddenly, it
appeared that genuine economic and political transformation, which many Africans believed would
be the outcome of decolonization and independence would finally come to fruition. In addition to the
political transformation that was taking place in the continent following the South Africa true
independence, many African countries were also transforming their economies as they engaged in
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) at the urging of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. For most Africans, the end of the Cold War was expected to usher in a new era of
policy autonomy as well as political and economic liberalization. The new era was expected to be
characterized by direct citizen participation in the design and implementation of policies affecting
their lives. In other words, the top-down, elite-driven approach to public policy, which had been
adopted at independence, was now supposed to give way to a more participatory, inclusive, bottomup, and people-driven approach to public policy. Under the latter, all of each country‘s relevant
stakeholders would be able to participate fully and effectively in the design and implementation of
policies affecting their lives. Under this new approach, the African countries would still participate
in global affairs—export and import goods and services, receive foreign aid, including food and
military aid, and engage in other international transactions—but, the maximization of African values
and objectives would now be the driving force behind any decisions taken by the African countries at
both the domestic and international levels. Of particular interest here, is the fact that many groups in
Africa believe that foreign aid in the post-Cold War era must be granted without any preconditions
on the part of the donors and that the aid‘s disbursement and allocation must be undertaken in a
transparent and accountable manner in order to ensure that it achieves the main objective of
providing the wherewithal for self-actualization for the poor.
Unfortunately, most of the West has resisted this new approach to development aid and
continues to use economic and development assistance as a foreign policy tool. While aid is no
longer used as a tool to garner partners for the fight against communism, many developed countries,
especially the developed industrial countries of the North, are using aid to gain access to Africa‘s
emerging markets—they want to secure markets from which they can extract important and critical
raw materials for their domestic industries and to which they can sell their excess output. These
―new‖ objectives of foreign aid are exactly like those of colonialism and hence, the relationship
between the African economies and the European countries is basically returning to what it was
during colonialism.
But, the question is what about Japan and the emerging economic superpowers of South
Korea and China? What types of foreign aid regimes do these countries, which themselves have, at
one time or another, been recipients of foreign aid, have? These countries, which are now major
68
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international aid donors, have declared their intent to follow a different path to the disbursement of
their aid resources to Africa. The question then becomes, to what extent will the foreign policy
objectives of these countries inform their foreign aid decisions? As Peter Hall (91-92) argues:
In technically complex fields of policy, such as macroeconomic policy-making, decisionmakers are often guided by an overarching set of ideas that specify how the problems facing
them are to be perceived, which goals might be attained through policy and what sorts of
techniques can be used to reach those goals. Ideas about each of these matters interlock to
form a relatively coherent whole that might be described as a policy paradigm. Like a
gestalt, it structures the very way in which policy-makers see the world and their role in it
(Hall 1995).
Indeed, ideas are the basis for setting policy agendas, debates, formulation and implementation. In
that respect, what the decision-makers perceive as attainable are often reflected in their worldviews.
It is often the willingness to look again at the familiar sets of ideas and institutions whose outcomes
have been less than expected that result in policy change for transformative outcomes. Thus, to the
extent that Western and Asian donors continue the practice of policy transfer, defined as ―a form of
decision making by analogy, using another entity‘s experience as a source of ideas and evidence,‖
(Mossberger and Wolman 2003), for policy in another setting where most of the funding decisions
and implementations are based on Western and Asian experiences devoid of policy lessons from
domestic realities, actors and institutions in sub-Saharan African states, foreign assistance whether
new or old will remain ineffective as a tool for significant economic development and growth in
Africa (see Hulme 2005) . Basically, if the new Asian donors—South Korea, China and Japan—
adopt approaches to development assistance that are similar to those utilized by the United States and
Western Europe—that is, allowing donor foreign policy objectives to determine the scope and nature
of aid—the latter will fail to have positive impact on economic and political transformation in
Africa. For aid to have the effect of helping improve living conditions in Africa, as well as creating
within the African countries, environments for the development of democratic cultures, the
advancement of aid from the developed countries to the African countries must be based on the
development needs of each African country.
While data and references across sub-Saharan Africa are used in the analysis in this work, we
will pay particular attention to the extent that ODA has yielded significant economic development in
Nigeria and Zambia. The paper begins with an introduction that delineates prevalent issues regarding
ODA in sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by a description of selected current economic data in
the region with closer focus on ODA to Nigeria and Zambia; and a discussion of the nature of aid
transfers and their relevance as a policy tool for alleviating poverty and promoting economic
development. The paper concludes with specific suggestions on how best to deploy aid transfers as a
tool for significant economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.
In this paper, I advance the argument that Africans and others (e.g., donors) engaged in and/or
interested in the economic development of Africa should think big, but implement their thoughts in
measured incremental steps in specific sectors of the African economies with a view to achieving
transformative and tangible outcomes. Consequently, the emerging donors‘ (i.e., Japan, South Korea
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and PRC) alternative approach is likely to succeed if they use their human capital and material
resources for investment in Africa in ways that directly engage domestic political actors, and civil
society organizations (especially those belonging to historically marginalized and deprived
stakeholders—women, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities, and the urban poor) within a highly
decentralized institutional environment that targets a single issue at a time rather than attempting to
solve all development problems in one swoop and perhaps, more importantly, assures that design and
implementation of development programs is bottom-up, participatory, and people-driven. Such an
approach is likely to make a positive difference in the lives of Africans because it will enable foreign
assistance to focus on issues that are critical to the people (e.g., institution building for economic and
political governance, capacity building for entrepreneurship, as well as conflict resolution, etc.) and
enhance the ability of governments to focus on high public priorities. For example, a foreign project
that focuses on helping domestic entrepreneurs seek and discover opportunities for profit
maximization (e.g., gaining access to new markets for locally-produced products through effective
utilization of new information technologies) can promote wealth creation and significantly increase
the local tax base. Increased generation of wealth locally should significantly minimize the need for
governments to depend on external debt as a way to secure resources for the provision of public
goods and services. Helping local people finance their own governments, instead of relying on
foreign subventions, will enhance civic responsibility and ensure that governments are accountable to
the governed. In addition, these types of interactions between the people and their government
should significantly improve the legitimacy of the government and the willingness of Africans to see
their government as their own creation and not a foreign imposition.
Current Economic Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa
Comparatively, states in the sub-Saharan region are burdened by low per capita income, high debt
rates, and lack of basic communication resources such as telephone lines, fax machines and
computers that are necessary for effective participation in today‘s information-dominated global
economy. In general, the African economies, almost without exception, lack the scientific and
technological infrastructures that are necessary for successful and gainful participation in what is
essentially a very competitive global economy. For example, a 1992 study found that in terms of
scientists and engineers per million populations, Africa had 53 compared to 3,548 for Japan, 209 for
Latin America, and 202 for Arab states (Kennedy 1993, 216). A more recent study that examines the
relationship between innovation and absorptive capacity and economic growth found that, relative to
other regions, Africa continues to lag behind. Based on gross domestic expenditure on research and
development as a percentage of world expenditure on research and development, while the figure for
developing countries is 15.6%, for the developed countries, it is 84.4%. The regional variation is
even more insightful. For Asia, the figure is 27.9%, Latin America & the Caribbean, 3.1% and for
sub-Saharan Africa (excluding the North African states), the figure is 0.5% (Onyeiwu 2011, 16).
The expenditure column is reflected in the actual proportion of African researchers in science and
technology compared to other regions. Thus, while the number of researchers as a percentage of
world totals for the developing countries is 28.4%, it is 71.6% for the developed countries. And, for
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Asia, the number is 34.5%, Latin America & the Caribbean, 6.7% and sub-Saharan Africa, the
number is 1.0% (ibid) of world total researchers in science and technology. The consequence of the
foregoing is that, the regional distribution of scientific and technical publications (2000 to 2005)
reflects the low trend in advancing scientific and technical knowledge in Africa as a foundation and
support for economic growth. For the period, average scientific and technical publications for East
Asia & Pacific is 29,998 with a growth rate of 119%; Latin American countries, 17,497, and a
growth rate of 36%; Middle East & North Africa, 4,839, with a growth rate of 69%; South Asia,
12,845 with a growth rate of 42%; and sub-Saharan Africa, 3,413, with a growth rate of 6% (ibid,
18). What the data reveal is the absence of the use of scientific and technological knowledge as tools
to enable a focused and strategic approach to development in sub-Saharan Africa. The data also point
to the declining nature of research and publication of scientific and technical knowledge necessary
for African states to engage in sustainable economic development projects. With a low knowledge
base in science and technology, producing value-added goods that are globally competitive in both
price and quality and which can be consumed locally, as well as exported, is quite challenging and in
many instances, not possible. The direct consequence is poor economic growth and development
characterized by persistent problems of high unemployment, low access to healthcare, poor
infrastructure, and low level of citizens‘ engagement in the socio-economic environment, especially
in education. This low attention to science and technology education is evident in the high costs of
transportation, energy and access to information technology through the Internet—all costs that put
constraints on new entrepreneurial activities and pressures on existing business concerns. Suboptimal technologies in the power sector and transportation, coupled with high costs of energy
imports for some countries and other logistical problems associated with economic development
result in high transaction costs of what is produced, frequently making them less competitive in the
international market (see IMF 2010). And, with the emigration of competent African scholars and
professionals to Europe, North America and Asia—economies that provide their citizens and
residents with technological environments that maximize their productive efforts—the creation of
the technologies that are relevant to problem solving in the African economies in general and wealth
creation, and hence, poverty alleviation, in particular, is likely to suffer. This vicious cycle is
bolstered by Africa‘s continuing reliance and dependence on the export of raw materials and partly
explains rampant poverty in the general population, as well as structural violence and opportunistic
behaviors on the part of civil servants and other government officials in the region (Mukum Mbaku
2007, see chapter 4).
Indeed, dependence on external resources such as ODA, debt, and other forms of external
assistance (e.g., military and food aid), has created within African governance institutions a set of
highly opportunistic individuals who use the aid industry as a scheme to extract extra-legal income
for themselves. These are civil servants and politicians who use government structures under their
control as instruments of plunder, and design and implement only public policies that provide them
personal benefits and not necessarily those that enhance the national welfare. Such elites are most
likely to steer donors into areas that may not produce positive benefits for society but which, will
allow the state custodians to significantly enrich themselves. In fact, it is unusual for such an
opportunistic civil servant or politician to approve a ―development‖ project that would generate
71
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enormous positive benefits for both the state custodian and his or her foreign benefactor but impose
enormous environmental and ecosystem damage in the domestic economy. Since such political
opportunism often occurs in an environment where leaders do not actively interact with citizens, the
latter are usually not aware of it—such leaders are usually quite susceptible to manipulation by
foreign actors. In fact, in the 1980s, many of these African leaders were easily railroaded into
undertaking so-called structural adjustment programs, which devastated domestic economies, impose
severe social costs on the poor, but provided a few elites with extra-legal income. Thus, while these
elites benefited from these programs, poverty rates increased significantly and perhaps more
important is the fact that the intensity of poverty and the levels of material deprivation among many
Africans rose substantially. Thus, in addition to the fact that many African economies lack the types
of institutional arrangements that adequately constrain civil servants and prevent them from engaging
in the various forms of opportunism, these economies do not possess the necessary economic
infrastructures to allow them to participate effectively, fully and gainfully in the modern global
economy. As a consequence, Africa continues to remain, as it was during the colonial period, on the
economic periphery, serving primarily as a source of raw materials for the industries of the
developed North and dumping ground for excess output, as well as ill-fitting ideas and technologies,
from the Western industrial countries.
This tendency toward mass consumption without the requisite productive capacity is reflected
in Benjamin Berber‘s argument that even though Africa may be falling off the world‘s economic
chart, it is home to an over 600-million person soft-drink market featuring warm climates, youthful
populations and governments moving toward market economies (Berber 1995). Indeed, the
interconnectedness that contemporary global political economy portends is one in which Africa‘s
assigned role is continued peripheral status in the global centers of power. Its consumerism is
reflected in the lucrative mobile phone business in Nigeria where almost everyone now carries a
mobile phone whether they can maintain it or not. In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI),
a UNDP global study shows that 22 of the 24 countries in the ―low human development‖ category
are African states. Given sub-Saharan Africa‘s total external debt at $195.7 billion—21.2% of its
GNI—and the focus of globalization on information and communications technologies and
biotechnology, the prospects for African states‘ full participation in the global economy remain
gloomy (UNDP 2009). External debt as a percentage of GDP is another indicator of the extent to
which economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa remain unable to meet the challenges of domestic
needs and external responsibilities, which are tied to the region‘s current incapacity to innovatively
transform from the post-colonial to the service/information economy of the 21st century that
demands attention to scientific and technological knowledge bases and production.
For example, with regard to overall investment, government fiscal balance in the region is
generally negative. Specifically, however, overall investment in Nigeria compared to Zambia
remains mostly positive. A snapshot of growth patterns during a period of relative stability reveals
that resource-rich sub-Saharan African states have better economic growth numbers compared to
non-resource-rich states. For the region, average real (GDP) growth for sub-Saharan Africa for
2004-2008 was 6.5 percent and declined to 2.5% in 2009. For Nigeria, real GDP growth for 200472
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2009 was 7.0% compared to Zambia which grew at 5.8% for the same period and increased to 6.3%
for 2009. For non-resource rich states like Kenya and Senegal, where infrastructures are relatively
better, but which are characterized by poor attention to knowledge production in the areas of science
and technology, low value-added economic activities are reflected in the average real GDP growth
for 2004-2008 at 6.2% for Kenya with 2.4% decline for 2009; while Senegal on average grew at the
rate of 4.4% from 2004-2008 but declined to 2.2% in 2009 (ibid, see Table SA1, 72).
For the sub-Saharan Africa region, total investment as a percentage of GDP for the period
2004-2008 was 21.1% with slight increase to 22.8% in 2009. Specifically, for Nigeria, average
investment as a percentage of its GDP for 2004-2008 was 23.1% with relative increase to 28.0% for
2009; for Zambia, it was 22.7% for the period 2004-2008 with a slight increase to 23.5% in 2009.
For the region, the gross national savings as a percent of GDP was 21.5% for 2004-08; while for
Nigeria it was 38.8% with increases to 42.1%; and Zambia 16.3% with increases to 20.3%. In 2009,
the region suffered a slight decrease of less than .01%. For Nigeria and Zambia (see Table 4), the
increases are largely explained by the infusion of investment from China in the natural resources and
infrastructural sectors that helped to boost the economies. But if we examine the overall fiscal
balance, including grants, the numbers are not encouraging. For example, for 2004-08, overall fiscal
balance for sub-Saharan Africa was only 1.8% of GDP with a significant decline by 2009 to -5.7%.
For Nigeria, the balance for the same period was 5.3% but by 2009 it declined to -10.3%; while
Zambia registered an overall balance of 2.4% in 2004-08 with a value of -3.2% of GDP in 2009
(ibid, see Tables SA6, 77; SA7, 78; SA8, 79). However, while the numbers for Nigeria do not
change if grants are excluded, the argument about low attention to value-added production through
science and technology education becomes more important for Zambia and the region as a whole if
grants are absent. For 2004-08, Zambia without grants experienced an overall fiscal balance of -6.8%
of GDP and -7.3% for 2009; for sub-Saharan Africa, the numbers are -0.1% and -7.2% respectively
(ibid, see Table SA9, 80) .
Similar to other indicators above, government debt in 2004-2008 for the region was 41.1% of
GDP but with significant decline to 33.3% in 2009; and for Nigeria, it was an average of 23.5% of
GDP in 2004-2008 declining to 15.5% in 2009. The decline is explained by the massive debt
forgiveness negotiated under the second Obasanjo regime (2003-2007) by the former Finance
Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. However, Zambia‘s average external debt as a percentage of GDP
for 2004-2008 was 63.8% with significant decline to 27.7% in 2009 (ibid, see table SA 12, 83). The
decline for Zambia is largely explained by international financial institutions and Chinese
government debt forgiveness programs as well as Chinese direct investment in Zambia. And, as a
consequence of the debt forgiveness for the region generally, external debt to official creditors also
declined as is shown in the data for SSA during 2004-08 which stood at 18.5% of GDP declining to
11.9% in 2009. During the same period (2004-2008), Nigeria‘s external debt declined from 12.3% of
GDP, reaching 2.6% in 2009; while Zambia‘s declined from 39.0% in 2004-08 to 12.3% of GDP in
2009 (ibid, see table SA24, 95). And as Table 1 indicates, Chinese foreign direct investment stock
has been increasing in Africa—resulting in the generally observed improved economic performance
in the region as well as in specific countries and sectors of the economies.
73
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Table 1: Chinese Investment in Africa
FDI Stock (US$, in millions)
1990
2005
Africa
49.2
1595.3
North Africa
3.4
618.4
Other Africa
45.9
976.9
Total World
1029
57200
..
3
FDI flows (% of total Chinese FDI flows)
FDI flows (US$, in millions)
1.5
369
Source: UNCTAD, 2007, ―Asian Foreign Direct Investment in
Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing
Countries‖ United Nations Publications

Indeed, as Table 4 below shows, most Chinese FDI in loans and grants targeted sectors of the
economies that require some form of advanced technology that most African countries do not have.
The expectation of advocates of technology transfer has been that with increased foreign direct
investment across Africa, technological transfers as well as other skills sets would enhance the
capacity of African states and citizens to develop their own resources to enhance economic and
social wellbeing.
However, overall, the Chinese approach, which utilizes exclusively Chinese citizens and
resources in implementing aid programs in Africa merely, continues the existing pattern of Western
engagement with Africa—without legacies of capacity building and measurable sustainable
economic improvement. The low level of scientific and technological knowledge creation within
certain parts of the world, notably, Africa, is reflected in the direction of FDI and portfolio
investments across the globe. Table 3 reflects the extent to which foreign economic interests, and to
some extent, Africans themselves, lack confidence in the socio-economic environment across various
states in the continent. Without a strategic vision to change the perception and reality of many
African states as either conflict ridden or ravaged by disease and hence, not suitable for investment,
it is likely that the direction of investments toward regions assumed to be politically safe with low
economic uncertainties will continue at the expense of regions such as sub-Saharan Africa where
these investments are really needed. The lacuna in effective investment as a strategy of economic
growth can be filled by emerging donors through changing their foreign aid strategies from ODA to
investment as discussed later in the paper.
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Table 2: Sectoral distribution of China’s FDI flows to
Africa, 1979-2000
Investment
Value (US$,
in millions)
Agriculture
22
48
Resource extraction
44
188
Manufacturing
230
315
Machinery
20
16
Home appliances
36
25
Light industry
82
87
Textiles
58
102
Other manufacturing
34
86
Services
200
125
Others
3
6
Total
499
681
Source: UNCTAD, 2007, ―Asian Foreign Direct
Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation
among Developing Countries‖ United Nations Publications
Sector

Number of
projects

Using global resource flows as a measure of benefits from the contemporary global economy
within the framework of free trade, Table 3 shows that most African states are marginalized,
neglected and under-invested. Empirically, the data on direct foreign investment (FDI), which occur
when foreigners acquire a controlling interest (stock ownership of 10 percent or more) in a business
enterprise in another country (Carbaugh 1995), are quite revealing compared to direct investment in
other regions, which, although are developing countries, are strategically located with regard to the
global marketplace. From Table 3, total FDI in selected sub-Saharan African countries in 2008 was
$14.3 billion compared to FDI of $9.5 billion to Egypt, $60 billion to Hong Kong and $75 billion to
Russia in the same year! Furthermore, compared to $11 billion FDI for Singapore, $10 billion for
Argentina, $40 billion to India and $24.3 billion for Mexico in the same period (see World Bank
2010), total FDI that went to selected sub-Saharan African countries reveals the marginal status of
most African countries from the interests of global investors and states.

75

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol5/iss1/5

10

Kalu: Styles of Foreign Assistance

African Social Science Review

Volume 5, Number 1, Spring 2012

Table 3 - Global Resource Flows to Selected African Countries, 2008 (Kieh and Agbese, 2012)
Countries
Net foreign Net
Net official External Debt
direct
portfolio
development debt as service
investment investment assistance
%
of ratio as %
flows
flows
(US$ millions) GNI
of exports
(US$
(US$
(ODA 2009)
of goods
millions)
millions)
and
services
Angola
1,678.9
-368.8 (0.5)
21.3
2.5
Burkina Faso
137
-997.9 (12.6)
21.2
-Burundi
3.8
-508.5 (43.9)
124.7
28.1
Cameroon
38.2
-1.2
524.6 (2.3)
12.1
-Central African Rep
121
-256.4 (13.0)
48.7
-Ethiopia
108.5
0.00
3,327.4 (13.0)
10.9
2.8
Ghana
2,111.5
0.00
1,293.2 (8.6)
31.3
3.2
Ivory Coast
402.4
78.8
616.5 (2.7)
56.0
9.2
Kenya
95.5
5
1,360.4 (4.5)
21.7
4.5
Malawi
37
-912.6 (21.2)
22.7
-Mali
127
-963.8 (11.4)
25.8
-Mozambique
587
0.38
1,993.7 (22.0)
39.4
1.2
Niger
147
-605.3 (11.3)
18.1
-Nigeria
3,635.5
-4,684
1,289.7 (0.7)
5.7
-Sudan
2,600.5
-0.05
2,383.5 (4.8)
37.5
2.5
Tanzania
744
2.8
2,330.7 (11.7)
29.9
1.2
Uganda
787.8
-32
1,656.7 (11.8)
15.8
1.7
Zambia
938.6
-5.6
1,085.9 (8.4)
23.0
3.2
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. The data in parentheses represent
the net Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI for 2008. Also, while for
2008 Foreign Direct Investment was $14.3 billion, Portfolio Investment total was $-4.6 billion.
Similarly, portfolio investment, which is defined as an investment in a state by foreigners in
which debt or stock ownership is involved, is as bad, if not worse, than FDI. Here, it is significant to
note that while portfolio investment results in claims on resources, quite often, no participation in
managing the company or asset is involved (Lairson and Skidmore 1997, 448). To that extent,
portfolio investment can be socio-politically interpreted as a measure of the confidence that
foreigners have in a state and its economy. And, while portfolio investments are generally not the
preferred option for most investors, the World Development Indicators 2008 database reveals the
concentration of portfolio investments to be mostly in the high and medium human development
categories of states. For example, while total portfolio investments for the selected sub-Saharan
76

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2012

11

African Social Science Review, Vol. 5 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5

African Social Science Review

Volume 5, Number 1, Spring 2012

African states given in Table 3 was $-4.6 billion, portfolio investment for the United Kingdom was
$70 billion, the United States was $126 billion and $17 billion for Hong Kong ( see World
Development Indicator 2010). Clearly, for African countries to develop sustainable economic
growth patterns that are sufficient to mitigate poverty and increase access to education, healthcare
and other public and private services, there is need to increase foreign direct investment, not
traditional ODA. The argument for direct investment as an external engine of economic growth is
specific. Foreign Direct Investment
. . . provides probably the most important and cheapest channel of direct technology transfer
to developing countries. . . . FDI is associated with the transfer of capital, technology, and
knowledge from the home to host countries. The potential to generate considerable
technological spillovers is explained by the propensity of foreign firms to conduct research
and development as well as their relatively superior technology compared to that available in
developing countries (see Ogbu et.al 2009, 105-152).
ODA to Nigeria and Zambia
For many years, ODA flows to Nigeria and Zambia did not have any significant measureable impact
on economic growth and development in these countries. In fact, most of the funds reaching these
countries as foreign development assistance, were easily swindled by unscrupulous civil servants and
politicians. Given the extremely high levels of bureaucratic and political corruption in these countries
and the failure of national institutions to hold the ruling elites accountable to the governed, it was
inevitable that foreign resource inflows, in the form of foreign aid to governments, would be
misappropriated. However, foreign financial flows in the form of FDI have had a significantly
positive impact on economic growth in Nigeria and Zambia. FDI in commodities export for several
African countries, and specifically, Nigeria and Zambia, have recorded measurable improvement in
economic activities since China increased its economic interest in the region in 2000. The general
assumption by UNDP and World Bank economists is that the fundamentals are good for continuing
improvement in economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa for the future.
Recently, analysts have lauded the improvements in economic activities that have occurred in
Africa in spite of the global financial meltdown and have attributed such improvements to the ability
of policymakers in many African countries to provide their economies with the appropriate or
enabling macroeconomic environment. What has been missing from this analysis is the role played
by FDI in such economic performance. Indeed, a closer examination of the sources of improved
economic performance in Nigeria and Zambia, for example, will show that cash infusion through
FDI in specific sectors of the two countries‘ economies by Chinese firms and government subsidies
for securing contracts for their companies have had a significant positive impact on recent economic
performance in these countries. As Tables 2 and 4 show, China‘s investments and grants have
generally targeted infrastructural construction and services sectors in Africa, and specifically, in
Nigeria and Zambia. Such grants include investments in FM radio transmitters, security
communications systems, construction of grain silos, rail lines and power stations. On the surface,
the investments in the infrastructural sectors of the Zambian and Nigerian economies are quite
laudable. Substantively, the sectors identified on Table 4 reveal a deeper problem of low science and
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technology education/skills discussed previously. While investments are preferred to loans and
outright aid without accountability and transparency, it would be even more effective if these
investments are based on joint ventures that truly partner with African countries, citizens and
corporations, and based on certain shared beliefs in the capacity of the investments to translate into
economic growth and social progress.
Indeed, as explained above, in spite of the positive economic improvement, government
fiscal balance remains negative largely because the FDI is not connected to any indigenously driven
policy framework that insists on ensuring that savings in one sector offset higher costs in another. In
order words, the savings generated by Nigeria and Zambia from increased investments from China
and loan forgiveness from the international financial institutions have not been utilized to effectively
ensure progressive improvement in other economic and social sectors of the state. Hence, the
continuing negative fiscal balance. Thus, while it appears that Nigeria and Zambia and other African
countries are reaping the rewards of increased Chinese attention in the continent through FDI, loans,
grants and debt forgiveness, these efforts are not translating into technology and skills transfers to
Africans. For African countries, the challenge is establishing enforceable policies to protect their
states‘ interests against poor contract performance by Chinese firms. While Europeans have used
unaccountable foreign aid to post-colonial dictators across the continent to maintain the legacies of
poor infrastructure and bad governance which they bequeathed to the exploited and looted African
countries they colonized, the Chinese, a non-former colonizer, uses a different brand of aid that is
different in its transparency. Although Chinese government policy is not to interfere in the internal
affairs of the African countries that it provides economic assistance, it is important to note that its aid
policy is designed specifically to maximize Chinese national objectives and not those of the recipient
countries. Hence, China‘s presence in Africa is not designed to enhance economic growth and
development in Africa but to help the Chinese government, through Chinese multinational
companies, extract critical raw materials (e.g., oil and minerals) for the country‘s home industries
and to prepare the African countries to serve as receptacles for excess output from Chinese
industries. In a way, then, China is not that different from the European and American capitalists
who have, in the past, been condemned for exploiting African vulnerabilities to enrich their own
citizens. In fact, without a change in strategy, the effect of China‘s development aid to Africa and
potentially that of other emerging donors, will remain the same as those of the continent‘s traditional
benefactors—the Western industrial countries. Without a fundamental change in the relationship
between African countries and these new donors, the continent will remain, as it has since the
colonial enterprise was first unleashed on unsuspecting Africans, as a source of raw materials for
industrial production in faraway lands and markets for what are often technologically obsolete and
dangerous products from those lands. The change in the relationship, of course, must come from and
be dictated by African policymakers. After all, development in countries such South Korea, PRC and
Taiwan, which are not major aid donors, was achieved only when these countries insisted on an aid
scheme or strategy that not only took their specificities into account, but allowed them to determine
the nature and scope of the projects to be pursued. In fact, it was the emphasis on partnerships and
joint-ventures with companies located in the donor countries that enhanced development in these
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emerging aid donors and allowed them to import necessary and relevant technologies for rapid
economic growth. Compare that with the situation in Africa where donors literarily force African
economies to accept obsolete and ill-fitting technologies as well as products, which quite often,
create health problems that these countries do not have the capacity to handle.
The concentration of global resources in regions that are considered politically safe and
economically ―profitable‖ shows that ongoing global processes are not new. Their intellectual
traditions and policy prescriptions are similar to modernization arguments and neoclassical economic
views of the existing liberal international institutions that advance the interests of industrialized
countries. However, more troubling than the investment issue is the reliance of most African states
on official development assistance as a significant form of national budget subvention. Table 3
reveals that ODA as a percentage contribution to most African states‘ GNI is in the double digits.
Also, if the high debt service ratio is computed as a percentage of exports of goods and services, it
becomes possible to see that the resources that African states receive in the form of ODA are used to
pay interests on outstanding loans to external institutions. The question is: given the fact that efforts
to use foreign aid to ―help‖ African states develop their economies and stabilize their domestic
political institutions and processes have not resulted in economic growth and political stability since
independence, what alternative approach is likely to become a game changer for the region‘s need for
economic development and political stability? The next section examines the argument for policy
transfer within the context of emerging donors‘ assistance to sub-Saharan African states.
Policy Transfer and Emerging Donors Effective Engagement with Africa
The literature on official development assistance and the extent it has succeeded or failed to advance
development, especially in Africa, is impressive. The core issue here is why ODA has failed to
achieve its stated policy objective of economic development (Kalu and Kim, 2009) and the extent to
which emerging donors like China, Japan and South Korea are able to adopt newer, more robust
approaches to foreign assistance to achieve more effective and measurable economic development
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa.
According to Mark Evans, ―policy transfer is a theory of policy development that seeks to
make sense of a process or set of processes in which knowledge about institutions, policies or
delivery systems at one sector or level of governance is used in the development of institutions,
policies or delivery systems at another sector or level of governance‖ (Evans 2004, 10). In this
sense, ideas and policies that have worked in one context and are assumed exportable to other
societies or institutions can be copied and contextualized and implemented in another setting.
Substantively, and as is evident in liberal democracy, policy transfer is not sui generis to Western
societies and can therefore be exported or implemented in other regions of the world. However, in
the contexts of educational and economic policies that have consistently been shown to be exportable
(with due modification and sensitivity to cultural contexts) the idea of policy transfer is more
verifiable from Western societies such as Britain and the United States to non-western states like
India, Japan, South Korea and China. According to Richard Rose (1991), policy transfer is quite
normal because ―every country has problems, and each thinks that its problems are unique. . . .
However, problems that are unique to one country . . . are abnormal . . . [because] confronted with a
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common problem, policy makers in cities, regional governments and nations can learn from their
counterparts elsewhere. . . ‖ (cited in Evans 2004, 12). In this sense, I argue that policy transfer that
targets science and technology education, managerial skills and collaborative projects in various
African states will yield productive economic activities that will resolve problems of unemployment,
poverty, access to healthcare and other socio-economic/cultural issues that tend to empower citizens
and investors to have confidence in various African states. Such targeted policy environments must
exist in a condition characterized by relative policy autonomy, enforceable rule of law, ODA as
investment as well as a merit-based process for identifying human capital necessary for reforming
state institutions, creating employment in the civil service and private industry.
It is not strange that after political independence, most states in Africa lacked the capacity for
designing and implementing economic development policies in the context in which decolonization
occurred. Unlike most former colonizers of Asian and Latin American territories, colonial powers in
Africa did not leave a legacy of infrastructure or effective governance institutions for managing the
economies, independent of the metropolitan economies. Indeed, unlike the British legacy of
effective civil service structure and education in India, many Anglophone states in Africa were left
without adequate technical manpower and subsequently had to rely on advice from international
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Ford Foundation and
other entities that were willing to second personnel and or ―how to‖ documents for running the new
nations.
Policy transfers are not, by themselves, problematic. It is often the contextual structure and
implementation that determine the extent such policy/idea borrowing becomes useful. As Mark
Evans states, ―Public organizations in both developed and developing countries do not always
possess the expertise to tackle the problems they confront and increasingly look outside the
organization to other governments or non-governmental organizations for the answers to problems‖
(Evans 2004, 3). In the case of African countries, the absence of sufficiently trained technical
manpower for running the civil service and the larger economies, coupled with a decolonization
project that was severely constrained by the politics of the Cold War, produced poorly managed
domestic economic institutions and states that came to depend very heavily on foreign resources
from these countries‘ former colonizers—most of these resource flows came in the form of foreign
aid. Unfortunately, these policy transfers were poorly articulated and managed and included
economic development projects that were structured around five-year development plans—and funds
for underwriting of these plans came from both the capitalist West and the socialist East. The most
important constraint to the effective functioning of these funds for genuine economic, political and
social transformation in the African countries was that, regardless of the source of the funds, the
maximization of African values and objectives was not the purpose of the transfers. The socialist
East transferred funds to Africa in order to bolster its ability to achieve global dominance; the
capitalist West acted similarly, to elicit Africa‘s help in its struggle against the spread of
communism. Hence, African economic growth and development rarely ever was considered a
legitimate factor to be considered in aid negotiations.
Subsequently, policy transfers included structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that were
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implemented across Africa in the late 1970s, irrespective of their domestic relevance. The
intensification of these policies in the 1980s and without measurable results led to the general
conclusion that the 1980s was a lost decade for Africa. Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz and Marsh
2000, 5-24) caution that when evaluating the relevance of policy transfers to African countries, it is
important to consider the actors and stakeholders. Frequently, the external actors often referred to as
political or economic consultants are not only private businesses but are sometimes recommended to
be hired by policy-recipient countries as part of the package for aid from such institutions as the IMF
and the World Bank. Thus, given the failures of previous policy transfers to Africa, as exemplified
by structural adjustment programs, going forward requires paying attention to the role of policy
consultants, their interests and expected outcome of transferred policy. According to Dolowitz and
Marsh, the role of policy consultants
. . . is particularly important because they tend to offer advice based upon what they regard as
the ―best practice‖ elsewhere, often paying little attention to the particular context in the
borrowing political system…. For example, Policy Management Groups (PMGS) are being
set up in numerous African countries, with little consideration of their appropriateness,
simply because one particular consultancy firm has been pushing this model into … countries
[such as] … Zambia and … Ghana and a number of other countries ( ibid, 10).
In the case of African countries, policy transfers have occurred under conditions of desperation, such
as during or immediately following civil unrest, economic crises or periods of negotiation involving
an African state‘s need to pay external debts or secure loans that require certificates of financial
health from the international financial institutions. Usually, the African state in question lacks a
neutral and technically competent epistemic constituency to offer advice on alternative options.
Clearly, international policy transfers under such conditions have not yielded transformative change
in the socio-economic conditions of distressed African states. And, although, in some instances, the
economic growth numbers may have changed in a statistically significant direction, the real story is
that the actual impact on the citizens of such a state has often been either minuscule or actually
negative. In many instances, some of these countries have suffered economic regression and citizens,
especially those who historically have been marginalized and deprived (e.g., women, rural
inhabitants, the urban poor, and minority ethnic groups), have actually seen their living standards
deteriorate.
Consequently, exploring policy transfers within the context of indigenously-structured
epistemic communities with adequate representation by technically competent experts from donor
countries is more likely to result in effective and sustainable policies with measurable impact on
economic growth and social progress. I use the concept of epistemic communities as conceptualized
by Peter M. Haas and defined as ―. . . a network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and in an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within
that domain or issue-area‖ (Hass 1992, 1-35). As an analytical construct and process, the logic of
epistemic community assumes that ―state actors are uncertainty reducers as well as power and wealth
pursuers‖ (ibid, 4) who need untainted but useable technical advice of consensus-seeking experts
unconstrained by bureaucratic tendency to protect existing budgets and roles in the government.
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Acting as ―channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as
from country to country‖ (ibid, 27), epistemic communities offer an excellent alternative vision and
opportunity for an emerging donor to envision a viable approach to effective deployment of foreign
assistance with measurable impact and outcome.
Indeed, the use of epistemic communities with technical expertise on development and
financial policies was one of several components of effective management of aid in South Korea that
transformed that country from poverty to wealth. South Korea‘s development was anchored by
strong leadership, efficient and talented bureaucracy as well as the Economic Planning Board, a
technically competent group of economic policy planners with shared paradigms and belief in the
agenda of Korean national development (Kalu and Kim 2009, 29-52). When the United States
reduced its aid flow to South Korea during the Kennedy Administration, ―the World Bank assisted in
the development of the International Economic Consultative Organization for Korea (IECOK).
Through IECOK, international financial institutions and the South Korean government met regularly
to discuss the nation‘s economic policies and effective use of foreign aid‖ ( ibid, 44), an essential
platform that helped to continue the work of the Economic Planning Board based on the shared
belief and commitment in South Korea‘s economic development.
It is not the case that coordinating structures similar to IECOK have not existed in some
African states. For example, in order to deal with a budgetary crisis and to implement a cash budget
system in Chiluba‘s administration in Zambia in late-1992, ―the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Zambia created a joint committee to oversee virtually all checks going out of the Finance Ministry‘s
accounts. . . . [It also created] the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority in 1994‖ (Rankner,
Walle and Mulaisho 2001, 559) to retrain tax collectors and enhance revenue collection for
development. However, beyond these ad hoc committees in Zambia, no sustained effort has been
made to use human capacity to deliberatively engage the intractable issues of development to think
through different policy options to make decisions that result in stable economic growth and social
progress. Rather, the ad hoc nature of these committees and/or institutions in Africa makes it
possible for leaders to cite political expediency as the reason for ignoring sound recommendations.
This was the case under Kenneth Kaunda and later Frederick Chiluba in Zambia whose use of
externally-derived one-size-fits-all policy transfers without attention to domestic relevance helped
them to justify jettisoning policies that were unacceptable to their constituency.
While an epistemic community can exist with all its expertise at the disposal of leaders in
Africa as elsewhere, it is up to the leaders to make the right decisions. Leaders must be open to the
influence of relevant ideas in their public policy selections. In the case of South Korea, this approach
worked out well, among other factors because of the firm commitment of the political leaders,
assisted by a cadre of efficient and competent bureaucrats, and complemented by a knowledge-based
expert group, the Economic Planning Board. The impressive economic outcome that is contemporary
South Korea is evident and remains a possibility that emerging donors can and should entertain in
their engagement with African countries. The concluding section suggests ways of engaging in
targeted use of ODA in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Concluding Remarks
In examining why aid succeeded or failed to improve economic performance in several African
countries, one of the main conclusions from a World Bank study asserts that ―in Zambia, policy
failed to improve—and actually got worse—despite a long series of adjustment loans and a mounting
volume of aid‖(Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001,25). Not only did the international
community fail to influence the government of Zambia, especially the Kaunda Administration, it
learned an important lesson that ―the conditionality mechanisms were unable to bring about policy
change as these measures were at odds with the economic ideology . . . [of the regime] . . . and
therefore were not supported by the political leadership. [Also], imperfect donor coordination
further reduced the credible threat of the conditionality instruments‖ (ibid, 572). Consequently,
official development assistance to Zambia experienced the ―nonreform paradox‖ as more aid led to
less accountability. Thus, while the donor community‘s focus on reform intensified, the recipient
government‘s focus was on obtaining more money from the donor community, and the result across
sub-Saharan Africa is inattention to viable strategies and poor outcomes for economic growth and
development (ibid, 582). With regard to Nigeria, the finding is that
Nigeria has received less foreign aid on a per capita basis than other countries in SubSaharan Africa. While average net real official development assistance (ODA) for African
countries in 1990-1996 was US$52 per person, Nigeria received just US$2.20 per person. As
a percentage of gross national production (GNP), net ODA for Sub-Saharan Africa averaged
14 percent, while for Nigeria it was less than one percent of GNP in the period. Debt
rescheduling, including the rescheduling of private debt (again, unusual for Africa), has been
as important as or more important than foreign aid flows during most periods of Nigeria‘s
economic history. As a result, the power of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in
relation to Nigeria comes from their unique ability to provide the ―certificate of good health‖
that is a necessary element of private debt rescheduling‖ (Herbst and Soludo 2001, 647).
Furthermore, the authors conclude that with regard to Nigeria, ―what is needed is to develop new
ideas about how Nigerian politics should operate, something that the World Bank, the IMF, and the
bilateral donors cannot provide. Only the Nigerians can do that‖ (ibid, 675). Indeed, while Zambia is
a classic case of an aid-dependent nation, Nigeria is a classic case of resource abundant country
under poor management. But, in either case, where Western interests have left, Asian interests are
being welcome by the same leaders and structures that have failed to deploy ODA for economic
development. Tables 5 and 6 show the involvement of Japan, South Korea and India in ODA
activities in Nigeria and Zambia. As Table 5 indicates, Japanese, South Korean and Indian ODA to
Nigeria over the past several years, especially since the early 2000 when Asian ODA emerged as an
important force in Africa, are statistically insignificant to influence the behavior of Nigerian
government officials. This is similar to the findings by the World Bank study referenced above. The
core problem with economic development in Nigeria is poor governance and mismanagement of
abundant resources. In a nutshell, Nigeria lacks institutional and human capacities to translate its
human and natural resources into globally competitive assets. This is where the emerging donor
community can invest in as discussed below.
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Table 5: Investment and Aid to Nigeria, 2000-2009
Japan
2000 2001 2002 2003
Loans, Gross
disbursement (current
..
..
..
..
US$, in millions)
Grants, Disbursement
2.63 13.91 19.1 20.24
(current US$, in millions)
Total ODA, Gross
disbursement (current
2.63 13.91 19.1 20.24
US$, in millions)
Grants (% of Total ODA)
100
100
100
100
FDI Inflows (US$, in
0.41 0.02
0.13
..
millions)
South Korea
Loans, Gross
disbursement (current
..
..
..
..
US$, in millions)
Grants, Disbursement
0.03 0.14
0.23
0.09
(current US$, in millions)
Total ODA, Gross
disbursement (current
0.03 0.14
0.23
0.09
US$, in millions)
Grants (% of Total ODA)
100
100
100
100
FDI Inflows (US$, in
0.85
..
..
..
millions)
India
FDI Inflows (US$, in
0.79 1.05
4.09
1.36
millions)
Source (Japan, S. Korea): OECD.StatsExtracts
Source (India): Reserve Bank of India
Source (FDI Inflows): Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

..

87.52

..

..

..

..

8.67

5.87

2120.6

26.84

28.96

28.88

8.67

93.39

2120.6

26.84

28.96

28.88

100

6.29

100

100

100

100

3.33

3.33

5.67

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

0.11

0.21

1.72

0.91

1.93

2.14

0.11

0.21

1.72

0.91

1.93

2.14

100

100

100

100

100

100

..

..

..

..

..

..

6.14

21.3

12.61

..

..

..

Table 6 shows Zambia as a classic case of an aid-dependent country—either on the ODA
from the industrial West as explained previously or on Asia. Zambian authorities have come to rely
on external resources for basic services to its citizens. And, as Table 4 shows, increased Chinese
direct investment in Zambia is complemented by sustained ODA activities by Japan, South Korea
and, more recently, India has joined the ODA train with lines of credit to the Zambian Government
for the Itezhi-Tezhi hydro power project in 2010. It is important to notice that in spite of the
sustained flow of both Western and Asian ODA to Zambia, especially since the 1980s, Zambia
remains one of the poorest countries in the World. It is ranked 150 out of 169 countries in the
Human Development Index (HDI) for 2010. While there are noticeable improvements since the
1980s, the report notes that overall, quality of life indicators such as health, knowledge and income
deteriorated throughout the 1990s, but finds that ―since 2000 all the components have improved;
HDI increased by 14.5%. If such pace is maintained, Zambia will attain its vision of being a
prosperous middle income country by 2030‖ (UNDP, Zambia Fact Sheet). What the report does not
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emphasize is that a significant reason for the observed improvement in Zambia is attributable to
economies of scale due to Chinese direct investment in Zambia as Table 4 above indicates.
Table 6: Investment and Aid to Zambia, 2000-2010
Japan
2000 2001 2002 2003
Loans, Gross disbursement
..
..
24.38
..
(current US$, in millions)
Grants, Disbursement
38.11 54.93 46.98 36
(current US$, in millions)
Total ODA, Gross
disbursement (current US$, 38.11 54.93 71.36 36
in millions)
Grants (% of Total ODA)
100
100 65.84 100
South Korea
Loans, Gross disbursement
..
..
..
..
(current US$, in millions)
Grants, Disbursement
0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12
(current US$, in millions)
Total ODA, Gross
disbursement (current US$, 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12
in millions)
Grants (% of Total ODA)
100
100
100 100
India
Lines of credit to Gov't of
..
..
..
..
Zambia (US$, in millions)
Purpose

..

..

..

..

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

..

..

..

..

..

..

-

21.79

748.09 31.53

94.61

37.14

36.64

-

21.79

748.09 31.53

94.61

37.14

36.64

-

100

100

100

100

100

100

-

..

..

..

..

..

..

-

0.02

0.11

0.21

1.05

0.68

0.92

-

0.02

0.11

0.21

1.05

0.68

0.92

-

100

100

100

100

100

100

-

10

..

..

..

10

..

50

General
purpose

..

..

..

General
purpose

..

Itezhi-Tezhi
hydro power
project

Source (Japan, S. Korea): OECD.StatsExtracts
Source (India): Reserve Bank of India

Similarly, Nigeria has not fared well. But, unlike Zambia, Nigeria‘s situation is not because of ODA;
overall ODA to Nigeria is statistically insignificant as a complement to oil revenue. For Nigeria,
ODA is simply a partial tool of engagement between the Nigerian authorities whose main interest
remains a financial clean bill of health for purposes of accessing private sector loans. Thus, given the
wealth that has been generated through oil revenue and crises-induced windfalls in petrol dollars as a
result of series of conflicts in the Middle East since the 1970s, life expectancy of below 50 years and
a general HDI of 142 out of 169 ( UNDP, Nigeria- Country Profile of Human Development
Indicator) for Nigeria are uninspiring. What these two countries and many sub-Saharan Africa
countries have in common is the lack of indigenously derived commitment to put economic
development on the policy agenda. In both countries, the donor community has been unable to focus
on the substantive issue of economic development in disbursing ODA. A key part of the problem has
been the nature of policy transfers in the form of ODA that have paid little or no attention to local
involvement or domestic ownership of the policy to be implemented. The consequence has been
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(unintended?) presence of active external ―development experts‖ in their SUVs administering
guidelines on reform policies to massively passive recipients of policy transfers and local
consumption of the outputs. However, while the majority of the citizens are passive because of their
non-involvement, government officials actively participate in the process of securing and disbursing
external aid. The combination described above provides excellent opportunities for non-performance
of policy reforms that are likely to increase opportunistic behaviors by civil servants, politicians and
other administrators. Without condoning corruption, it is irrational to expect bureaucrats and other
public servants to be motivated by public interest only while assuming entrepreneurs and the rest of
the citizens to be motivated by private interests, especially under clear conditions of scarcity. Under
such considerations, it is necessary to begin to (re-)activate epistemic communities across Africa.
Such communities should be commissioned with the clear intention of mobilizing an excellent
alternative vision as they provide necessary leadership on how to use human capacity to
deliberatively engage the intractable issues of development, guiding citizens and leaders to think
through different policy options to make decisions that will result in stable economic growth and
social progress on the continent.
Suggestions
Clearly, it is self or national interests that motivate both Western and non-Western donors‘ activities
in Africa and elsewhere. And, irrespective of the noted difference in its form of engagement with
Africa, China‘s patterns of interactions are similar in approach and general outcome with those of the
West. Given this conference‘s theme of Styles of ODA and the extent to which the Asian nations‘
ODA differ from Western ODA, there are specific ways to change the style and substance of ODA.
Especially, the emerging donor communities‘ efforts should continue to aim for the desired objective
of achieving economic development outcome of recipient states while securing economic and
national interests of the donor community. If the patterns of interactions are changed to require that
ODA be considered on the basis of targeted projects whose frameworks are linked to national policy
for economic development that specifies strategies for whom, what, when and how the project is to
be completed as precondition for aid, the outcomes are likely to be measurable improvements in
economic growth and social progress in the target countries. Given that anyone can spend money or
resources, but not necessarily in a wise way, ODA should be based on a clearly articulated proposal
of what and how the aid will be used. The expected impact and outcome of each project should be
clearly articulated and understood by both donor and recipient states. In that light, and given that aid
donors and recipients are self-interested actors with expectations of advancing their own objectives, a
neutral entity is both necessary and sufficient for making Asian ODA measurably different from the
Western in at least three ways.
Although there is a need to change the general perception of official development assistance,
what needs immediate and special attention is changing the notion of foreign aid. Based on existing
experience and as demonstrated by the notion of ―nonreform paradox,‖ most of the recipients of
foreign aid tend to treat it as free lunch or free money and consequently have not idealized the
process of translating ODA into local/domestic economic development projects. In contrast to the
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idea of aid as free money, South Koreans as aid recipients did not just hand out U.S. food aid to the
hungry; rather, people had to work in order to receive the food. And, as painful as it may have been
at the time, the consequence was that the government and the people invested in themselves and the
outcome is a transformed society from abject poverty to reasonable wealth. Thus, theoretically, ODA
should be changed to ODI—official development investment. When aid is treated as investment by
the donor and recipient, both the investors and the target state will, as a matter of course, engage in
feasibility studies to determine why resources should be invested in a particular segment of the
economy or society and the mechanisms for accountability.
Secondly, one of the major constraints to economic development and social progress in subSaharan Africa is the poor state of science and technology education. From USAID to United
Nations reports, only 9% of students in the region enroll in science classes, which explain the ratio of
only 48 researchers for every one million people in sub-Saharan Africa. Official development
investment in science and technology education that links science education in an African country
with science education experts, departments and programs in the donor‘s country will benefit both
donors and the recipients because such collaboration will build trust through joint research,
publications, and mutual respect that comes from exchange of expert knowledge, especially if such
exchanges result in setting the agenda for joint research programs. Such a shift in the style of ODA
efforts will solve the problem of lack of ownership in the existing ODA programs that have resulted
in non-policy performance.
In Nigeria, for example, joint research could become the basis for the award of construction
contracts that could finally reactivate and enable the completion of old and unsuccessful projects like
the Ajaokuta Steel Mill that has been under construction and different managements for the last 30
years without a pound of steel to show for the wasted billions. Such joint research could also
become the basis for teaching science, mathematics, and technology from primary—to tertiaryschool levels that will help strengthen the human and institutional capacities needed to engineer
economic development in target states. At the same time, such joint efforts will create and enhance
markets for the talents and products in the donor country. Rather than aid, investment is the
transformational strategy for ensuring that ODA from Asia to Africa will be significantly different
from ODA from the West to Africa.
Lastly, in addition to changing perceptions of ODA as free lunch to one of investment,
serious consideration should be given to using indigenously derived projects in the development of
collaboration strategies with donor countries. In addition to exploring indigenous knowledge bases in
science and technology, other areas of need such as climate change, environmental sustainability and
economic development in Africa would also benefit from such considerations. In many ways,
emphasis on climate change and economic sustainability is about ensuring the availability of
sufficient food to feed people. For many African countries, the existing pattern of ODA from the
West has substantially undermined the capacity of Africans to grow food in the continent. Foodrelated development aid is one in which Western nations have consistently subsidized their own
farmers, which depresses the price of agricultural products from Africa with the direct consequence
that many African farmers have been rendered incapable of farming profitably because of the
availability of cheap imported food from subsidized Western farmers, as well as, the unavailability of
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appropriate and affordable agricultural technologies. One of the ways the Asian ODA can be
different is by targeted regional engagement with African farmers—through appropriate
consultations with these farmers, projects can be designed that help increase yield per acre, ensure
that these farmers produce enough food to feed their populations and hopefully save some for export
to earn the foreign exchange that these countries need to purchase technology for national
development. The issue is whether emerging Asian donors will dare to be different in developing
their styles of ODA from that of the Western donors, which has largely undermined genuine
development efforts by the use of ODA as foreign policy tools without regard on its impact on
African countries. Changing the style to development investment based on emerging donors‘ use of
their human capital and material resources in Africa will directly engage domestic political actors,
institutions and norms and result in jointly identified projects that will contribute to mutual strategic
and economic development and social progress for donor and recipient states.
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